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John Proios 
One of the questions about the fundamental structure of reality that Aristotle 
sets out to explain in Metaphysics xii is the rotary motion of the outermost sphere 
(1071b3-11, 1072a21-23).1 For Aristotle, this is a question about the 
metaphysical features of substance that figures in a more general exploration of 
its principles (1071b3-5, 1069a19-26). In xii 6 Aristotle argues both that eternal 
rotation is necessary for the existence of motion (κίνησις, 1071b6-11) and that 
eternal rotation requires a principle of which the substance (ἡ οὐσία) is actuality 
(ἐνέργεια, 1071b19-22). According to xii 7, an unmoved substance (the ‘Prime 
Mover’) produces the sphere’s eternal rotation as its final cause. 
Some of Aristotle’s readers have not found the Prime Mover sufficient, within 
Aristotle’s own system, to cause the sphere’s rotation. I attempt to respond to the 
following challenge:  
Contrastive Question: Why does the Prime Mover’s causal influence result in 
the sphere rotating, rather than, or in addition to, thinking, or resting? 
That is, the causally relevant features of the Prime Mover could result in the 
sphere eternally contemplating, or being at rest, irrespective of rotation. This 
perception that Aristotle offers an inadequate explanation of the sphere’s rotation 
goes back at least to Theophrastus and has remained a source of debate until the 
present.2 The following two claims capture a traditional reply, which will serve 
as a stalking horse for the position this paper defends:  
Imitation Thesis:3 (1) For any x, y, and z, if x zs in order to imitate y, y is a final 
cause of x’s z-ing. (2) The primary sphere rotates in order to imitate the Prime 
Mover, and this is what Aristotle means when he says that the Prime Mover is 
an end and moves as an object of love (1072b3).  
(1) and (2) have come under fire from certain well-known objections.4 My 
1 References to the Metaphysics are to the Ross 1924 text. All translations are my own except 
where noted. In translating the Metaphysics, I have consulted Ross 1924 and Alexandru 2014, and I 
have benefitted from Frede and Charles 2000. For all other references and translations, I have used 
the Greek in the Loeb editions. 
2 Metaphysics 5a23-5, 5b7-10 (in Gutas 2010). Broadie 1993, 380 and 2009, 240 represents the 
primary proponent of the challenge today; cf. Berti 2000, 200-206, Bodnár 2016, 251, Laks 2000, 
221, and Ross 2016, 218. Often the emphasis is on contemplation as an alternative to rotation: 
Bradshaw 2001, 8 and Ross 2016, 213. 
3 DeFilippo 1993, n22, Elders 1972, 177, Richardson-Lear 2004, 86-90, Ross 1924, i cxxxviii, 
Ross 2016; cf. Bodnár 2016, Menn 2012, 448. The view is routinely assumed in related contexts (e.g., 
Henry 2013, 257 and Scharle 2008, 158).
4 Broadie 1993, 381-384 objects that (1) involves an ‘exemplary’ cause, rather than a final cause, 
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interest in the conjoined claims is only in their adequacy as an answer to the 
Contrastive Question. Assuming that the Prime Mover is a final cause and a 
moving cause,5 key questions remain regarding how his causal properties 
account for the sphere’s rotation. Section 4 argues that the Imitation Thesis does 
not answer them adequately.  
While one of my aims is to argue for that negative conclusion, the primary aim 
is to offer an interpretation of Aristotle’s account of the cause of cosmic rotation 
that demonstrates its explanatory adequacy as far as possible. I argue that within 
its dialectic, Aristotle’s argument in xii 7 is supposed to show that the features of 
the unmoved substance that account for the sphere’s rotation are the same 
features that the sphere takes on by rotating. The sphere’s aim is simplicity and 
actuality as a substance. Rotation makes it satisfy this goal, just as the Prime 
Mover’s activity, contemplation, makes the Mover simple and actual (1072b14-
30, 1074b15-1075a10). The relevant argument in xii 7 comes after Aristotle 
argues that intelligible objects move while being unmoved (1072a23-30), but 
before his conclusion that the Prime Mover is a specific kind of end (1072b1-4): 
Intelligence is moved by the intelligible, and one side of the 
table (ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία) is in-itself intelligible; and of that, 
substance is primary, and of that, the simple and actual6 (yet 
what is one and what is simple are not the same: for what is one 
signifies a measure, while what is simple its own disposition). 
But surely the fine and intrinsically choice-worthy are also in 
the same side of the table, and the first is always best or 
analogous.7 (1072a30-1072b1) 
I call this ‘the sustoikia argument’. Section 2 argues that it answers the challenge 
from xii 6 of showing that there is a pure actuality that produces the sphere’s 
rotation by identifying the simple and actual sort of substance as the sphere’s 
and that contemplation would be a better way to imitate the PM than rotation. Cf. Richardson-Lear 
2004, 86-90 and Ross 2016. Broadie 1993 and Berti 2000 object that (2) cannot be squared with the 
PM’s efficient causality. Cf. Judson 1994 and Bradshaw 2001. Berti 2000, 200-206, Bradshaw 2001, 
7, Broadie 1993, 384, and Laks 2000, n37 object that Aristotle never talks about the sphere imitating 
the PM. Cf. Bodnár 2016, 251-254. 
5 See Judson 1994 and Bradshaw 2001 for responses to the central challenges from Broadie 
1993, in addition to the discussion below. Although my account does not exploit the PM’s unique 
form of contemplation as key to his dual causal role, it seems plausible that being a simple and actual 
substance may account for the dual causal role in the way that any teleological mover is unmoved (cf. 
MA 7.700b4-701a6), or in the way that intelligence may be good and a mover in virtue of the same 
causal powers (cf. Meta. i 2.984b8-22). Judson 1994, 164-166 gives a general defense of the dual 
kind of cause that does not hinge on contemplation. 
6 The demonstrative pronouns, ταύτης…ταύτης, indicate the scope of the class being divided. To 
paraphrase: substance is the primary sort of intelligible, and the simple and actual is the primary sort 
of intelligible substance.
7 νοῦς δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ κινεῖται, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία καθ’ αὑτήν· καὶ ταύτης ἡ οὐσία 
πρώτη, καὶ ταύτης ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν (ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ἁπλοῦν οὐ τὸ αὐτό· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἓν 
μέτρον σημαίνει, τὸ δὲ ἁπλοῦν πὼς ἔχον αὐτό). ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἐν τῇ 
αὐτῇ συστοιχίᾳ· καὶ ἔστιν ἄριστον ἀεὶ ἢ ἀνάλογον τὸ πρῶτον.
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final cause. 
Consequently, explaining how rotation achieves simplicity and actuality 
provides the resources to answer the Contrastive Question. Section 3 argues that 
rotation is in certain relevant respects simple and completely actual, while it is 
incompletely actual in other ways. On the one hand, it is an incomplete actuality 
as a form of motion. On the other hand, the sphere’s uninterrupted rotation has a 
unique structure: any point in the locomotion across the circular rotary path 
completes the circle. The sphere repeatedly and eternally completes a rotation. 
Moreover, rotation may indefinitely extend while remaining simple. In this way, 
the sphere achieves the condition of being a simple and actual substance at which 
it aims.  
I. The Framework of xii 1-5 and the Problem of xii 6 
Aristotle introduces unmoved substance in xii 6 as the third among three kinds 
of substance (1071b3-5), in addition to the two kinds of natural substance, one 
sensible and the other eternal (1069a30-31). This introduction comes in the 
context of xii 1-5, where Aristotle articulates the principles (ἀρχαί), causes 
(αἰτία, 1069a16-17), and elements (στοιχεία, 1069a30-33) of natural substances. 
In 1-5 he offers an account of the types of causes of changes in substances and 
how they interact with each other. The moving cause, the form it produces, and 
the form’s privation, account for the changes in substances. The form-privation 
distinction also corresponds one-for-one to pairs of contraries (e.g., heat and its 
privative). Combined, on Aristotle’s account the moving cause produces a 
(positive) form in a (privative) material substrate that underlies the change 
(1069b3-7). This analysis explains generation or substantial change, alteration of 
quality, increase and decrease, and locomotion or change of place (1069b9-14), 
which exhaust all changes of substances.8 Aristotle also maps the 
actuality/potentiality distinction into this framework. Every material is 
potentially the actual form it becomes, e.g., the surface that is potentially white 
becomes actually white (1069b15-20; cf. 1070b20-21).  
These distinctions help to explain the particular problem Aristotle produces as 
motivation, in xii 6, for the existence of an unmoved substance identical to an 
actuality. Time and motion are both necessarily eternally continuous (συνεχής), 
by the following considerations. If time were not eternally continuous, there 
would be a before and after time itself, which is impossible (1073b8-9). Time, 
then, has to be eternally continuous in order to be possible (and we observe it 
exists, so it is possible). Parallel considerations apply to motion, since time is 
either the same as motion or an affection (πάθος) of it (1071b9-11). The only 
continuous form of motion is rotary locomotion (1071b10-12). Moreover, since 
eternal rotation requires some eternally rotating substance, necessarily there is an 
eternally rotating substance, since necessarily there is time and motion (cf. 
1069a19-21, 1071a34-35; Ph. iii 1.200b33-201a3).  
The actuality/potentiality distinction also has work to do for the problem of xii 
8 Cf. Ph i 7.190b28-191a5, GC i 1.314b26-28, 2.315a26-28, 5.320a9-26. 
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6. Before he explains how there is an eternally rotating substance, Aristotle 
articulates the following principle:  
Priority Principle: If something is capable of moving or producing, but is not 
acting (μὴ ἐνεργοῦν), there will not be motion: for what has a power could fail 
to activate (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὸ δύναμιν ἔχον μὴ ἐνεργεῖν). (1071b12-14) 
If a substance has a capacity for a corresponding actuality, the possession of the 
capacity does not explain its actuality. The activation of a substance’s capacity 
requires a separate actuality to bring it from capacity to actuality. Since the 
problem regarding motion shows that there is necessarily an eternally rotating 
substance, and the Priority Principle shows that for that substance to rotate 
eternally, there has to be a purely actual source of its motion that does not require 
a further actuality as its own cause (1071b18-19), Aristotle concludes that there 
is a principle whose substance is actuality (ἐνέργεια, 1071b19-22). The purely 
actual source of motion cannot be the same as the rotating substance.9 Eternal 
beings’ motion entails capacity, even if their substance is actuality: the sphere 
can be otherwise than it is ‘in place, even if not in substance’ (1072b6-7; cf. ix 
8.1050b6-27).10  
There are two final features of the arguments that anticipate the Prime Mover 
that are important to the position I defend. First, it is clear that the actuality 
responsible for the sphere’s rotation is its moving cause. In the analysis of natural 
change in xii 1-5, every pair of contraries (the form and privation) has a moving 
cause that produces or eliminates the form, for instance, the medical art produces 
health or disease in a body; carpentry produces a house or ‘a certain disorder’ out 
of bricks (1070b26-30); a human gives birth to a human (1070a8 and b31). All 
change happens ‘by art or by nature’ or by their opposites, ‘by chance or by 
spontaneity’ (1070a6-9). The Prime Mover plays the role of nature or art 
(1071b31-36). Additionally, some moving causes are type-identical in form to 
what they move while being ontologically separate as moving causes. The 
moving cause is in a way the same as the formal cause, as the medical art is in a 
way the same as health, the art of building the form of the house, and as a human 
being produces a human being (1070b33-34). Yet the formal and moving causes 
make distinguishable causal contributions to the existence and nature of an 
individual natural substance. The form is an elemental principle and cause, 
inhering in the subject of change (cf. 1070a21-24 and a7-9), while the moving 
cause is external (1070b22-35).11 For while the human reproducer and the human 
9 Pace Broadie 1993, 386-388 and 2009, 240-242. Cf. Judson 1994, 162-163.
10 The sphere’s capacity for relocation is the subject of section 3. However, one might also 
worry that my account does not explain why the PM satisfies the Priority Principle. According to my 
account, the PM produces rotation because the PM is simple and actual as a substance, in virtue of its 
contemplation. I do not think this means that the PM does not necessarily act, since on my account the 
PM is simple and actual because of its eternal self-contemplation, so in the service of being 
completely actual, the PM must engage in the activity of thinking.
11 Consequently, some movers, like the Sun, are causes of the generation of many particular 
beings with which they are identical neither in matter nor form (1071a15-17). But even the moving 
causes that share a form universally with what they cause are movers in virtue of forms that are 
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offspring each have human forms organizing each one’s composition, the 
reproducer’s form as a moving cause is ontologically separate from the offspring. 
Because the father uses his human reproductive organs to produce the offspring 
(making his form as human its moving cause), some offspring generates into a 
human being (making its form as human its formal and final cause). In this way, 
the parent and child share a form ‘universally’ or ‘in general’, even though there 
is no causally active universal form, just the particular, separate, forms acting in 
different causal roles in the shared process (1071a19-24, cf. a15).  
I suggest that the Prime Mover is the sort of moving cause that is type-
identical in form to what he causes.12 Aristotle plausibly associates actuality with 
this type of moving cause: one sense in which everything has the same causes is 
that what is ‘first in actuality’ is the cause (1071a35-36). While it is possible that 
this is a reference to the Prime Mover (Tredennick 1933 and Elders 1972, 136), I 
suggest instead that one sense in which everything has the same cause is that 
everything that changes has as an efficient cause of its change something that is 
already in actuality the form (universally) that the subject of change is in poten-
tiality. A plausible backreference is the claim that ‘the primary principles of all 
things are that which is first in actuality here and another first in potentiality…, 
<as> Peleus is the principle of Achilles, your father of you, and the B here of the 
BA there’ (1071a18-23).13 Since the Prime Mover is the principle whose sub-
stance is pure actuality, we should expect Aristotle to think that he is the kind of 
moving cause whose actual form is type-identical to the form it causally brings 
from potency to actuality. Certainly, the Prime Mover cannot be or have a form 
in the sense of arrangement of some material, or actuality of some capacity. But 
the sustoikia argument describes the Prime Mover as certain positive terms in 
pairs of contraries. We have seen that in  xii 1-5, the analysis of change involves 
a moving cause instantiating one of a pair of contraries in a material. Since the 
sustoikia argument identifies the Prime Mover with positives in a particular 
series of pairs, it is plausible that the Prime Mover’s causal features stem from 
the formal condition the sustoikia argument attributes to it: simple and actual 
substance. Below I maintain that the Prime Mover’s eternal self-contemplation 
and the sphere’s eternal rotation are coordinate activities in virtue of which each 
instantiates the shared form of being a simple and actual substance.14  
separate from the elemental forms inhering in what they move; their own forms are elemental causes 
in them while being external movers of separate substances. 
12 An obstacle to this suggestion is that at xii 4.1070b34-35 Aristotle says that there is in addition 
‘that which as first of all things moves all things’. This is traditionally taken as a reference to the PM 
and to be a case of non-type-identical moving causes (Crubellier 2000, 158-159, Ross 1924, ii 361), 
Tredennick 1933). However, it is not clear to me why Aristotle would deploy the PM before he estab-
lishes its existence, especially when the Sun is a ready example. Further, Aristotle has just listed type-
identical moving causes (1070b33-34), and ‘still beyond these’ could indicate a forceful example, 
rather than a contrast in kind.
13 See also the universally quantified claim in xii 3.1070a4-5 that every substance comes to be 
from something that shares in name the form it comes to be. 
14 Moreover, the Prime Mover in some respect stands to the sphere as parent to offspring 
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The Contrastive Question problematizes the Prime Mover’ production of 
rotary motion in the sphere. One especially pressing issue is that I claimed that 
the Prime Mover’s formal condition is the aim that causes the sphere’s rotation. 
If rotation is the form of the sphere’s change, but the Prime Mover does not 
move, this seems impossible.15 The rest of this paper is devoted to vindicating 
Aristotle’s account as far as possible.  
II. Explaining Rotation 
I suggest that xii 7 discharges its primary dialectical duty of coherently 
articulating the purely actual principle of the sphere’s eternal rotation (1072a19-
23) in the sustoikia argument. Given that the sphere’s mover must be unmoved 
(1072a23-26), Aristotle argues that it must move as an object of intelligence 
moves (1072a26-30): 
The object of desire and the object of intelligence (τὸ νοητόν) 
move this way: it moves while not being moved. The primary 
of these are the same. For the desired seems fine, but the 
primary thing wished for really is fine. And we desire because 
it seems <fine> rather than it seems <fine> because we desire 
it. For understanding (ἡ νόησις) is the principle (ἀρχή). 
(1072a26-30)  
This passage presents two candidates for an unmoved mover, the object of desire 
and the object of intelligence. It argues that the object of intelligence is more 
fundamental than the object of desire. Things seem desirable because of an 
intellectual grasp of them as attractive.16 Hence, the most fundamental source of 
motion is the intellectual source. Dialectically, the argument identifies the type of 
object that can be the principle (ἀρχή) whose substance is actuality (1071b20): 
‘understanding is the principle’. The subsequent sustoikia argument elaborates 
the intellectual principle of the sphere’s rotation:  
Intelligence is moved by the intelligible, and one side of the 
table (ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία) is in-itself intelligible; and of that, 
substance is primary, and of that, the simple and actual (κατ’ 
ἐνέργειαν) (yet what is one and what is simple are not the 
same: for what is one signifies a measure, while what is simple 
its own disposition). But surely the fine and intrinsically 
choice-worthy are also in the same side of the table, and the 
first is always best or analogous. (1072a30-b1) 
The sustoikia argument specifies what is fine such that it moves the sphere as its 
final cause. All of the subsequent arguments are devoted to explaining how 
(1072b35-1073a3, discussed below). Cf. Broadie 1993, Kosman 1994, and Matthen 2001, which 
argue that the Prime Mover is the sphere’s soul, and so a formal cause of its rotation. Yet this is 
problematic; see Judson 1994.
15 One of the main challenges from Broadie 1993, 377-386.
16 See Laks 2000, 221-223, Bradshaw 2001, 4, and Ross 1924, ii 375-376 for more discussion of 
this argument.
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Aristotle has answered the challenge he set for himself in the previous chapter. 
He concludes next that making a division among kinds of ends explains how 
there is an end among the unmoved substances (1072b1-2). The end among the 
unmoved substances is an aim (τινός) rather than a beneficiary (τινί, 1072b2-3).17 
That Aristotle now defends there being this sort of end among the unmoved 
substances suggests that the argument he gives immediately before claims that 
there is an end, such that the disambiguation is necessary. Aristotle then explains 
that the Prime Mover moves as an object of love,18 while what it moves moves 
everything else (1072b3-4), a view defended in the previous chapter (1072a9-
19); he argues that the Prime Mover is purely actual in a way that the sphere’s 
capacity for rotation precludes (1072b4-10), explaining how he has answered the 
primary problem from the previous chapter; he establishes that the Prime Mover 
is necessary (1072b10-13), the claim announced and problematized at the start of 
xii 6 (1071b4-5); he also explains that the Prime Mover’s necessity makes him 
fine, and because fine, the principle of the sphere’s motion (1072b10-11).19 
Aristotle treats his own dialectical responsibility as limited to defending the 
argument that there is a certain kind of unmoved substance such that it is a final 
cause of the sphere’s rotation and explaining how it meets the desiderata he set 
out in xii 6. This implies that he has already articulated the relevant teleological 
features of the sphere’s mover, and I suggest that he does so in the sustoikia 
argument.  
It seems reasonable, then, to try to understand how the sustoikia argument 
establishes the relevant teleological features of the intelligible object first 
identified at 1072a26-30 such that it is an unmoved mover of the sphere. 
Aristotle employs a sustoikia in a number of places (Meta. i 5.986a23, iv 
2.1004b27, xi 9.1066a15, xiv 6.1093b12, GC i 4.319a15, DS 7.447b30, 448a16, 
PA iii 7.670b21, Ph. iii 2.201b25).20 It is a series of contrary features, such as 
being and non-being, one and many, or odd and even, organized into two 
columns of a table; the positive contraries form their own column because they 
have the contents of the features, whereas the members of the other side are 
essentially privative. In the present context, Aristotle uses the argument 
identifying the object of intelligence as the most fundamental source of motion 
(1072a26-30) to divide the sustoikia into its two positive and negative columns. 
Since the relevant unmoved mover moves as an intelligible object, and since one 
side of the sustoikia is intrinsically intelligible, the Prime Mover’s causally 
17 The distinction is also made at DA ii 4.415b2-3, Ph. ii 2.194a35-36, and EE viii 3.1249b15. 
18 Many defenders of the Imitation Thesis emphasize that the Prime Mover moves as an object 
of love (e.g., Richardson-Lear 2004, 85, Bodnár 2016, 249-254). But I would suggest that the 
sustoikia argument provides what the sphere loves, which helps us understand the causal basis of the 
sphere’s love. 
19 I would suggest partitioning the rest of xii 7 into (i) a discussion of the divine life of the PM 
(1072b14-30), (ii) a response to an objection (1072b30-1073a3), and (iii) an addition that the PM 
must be without spatial dimension (1073a3-13). 
20 The helpful collection of references is due to Ross 1924, ii 376, reproduced in Laks 2000, n47, 
which adds Meta. i 3.1054b35 and x 8.1058a13.
355
relevant features are in that column, if anywhere. Aristotle then divides the 
intrinsically intelligible side using primacy as the criterion, first identifying 
substance, then identifying, within substance, the simple and actual.21 That is, 
‘substance’ (ἡ οὐσία) picks out the primary member of the intelligible column of 
the table, of which the simple and actual (ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν) is the 
primary subordinate kind.  
My main claim is that these positive formal properties of the Prime 
Mover, being a simple and actual substance, teleologically account for the 
sphere’s rotation. After clarifying what he means by ‘the simple’, Aristotle adds 
that ‘but surely the fine and the intrinsically choice-worthy (τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δι’ 
αὑτὸ αἱρετόν) are also in the same side of the table’, and ‘the first is always best 
or analogous’. I suggest that in these lines Aristotle explains why it is justified to 
view the class of entity he has just identified on one part of the sustoikia, simple 
and actual substance, as the final cause of eternal rotation. By ‘but surely the fine 
and intrinsically choice-worthy are on the same side of the table’, Aristotle does 
not mean that there are separate entries for ‘the fine’ and ‘the intrinsically choice-
worthy’ on the intelligible side of the sustoikia. He means that what he has just 
identified is fine and intrinsically choice-worthy, because there are such entries 
on that side of the table.22 This is why Aristotle then explains that ‘the first is 
always best or analogous’. ‘The first’ is the simple and actual substance he just 
partitioned within the intelligible side of the sustoikia on the basis of their 
primacy. That the first ‘is always best or analogous’ explains that it ιs because 
simple and actual substance is primary that there is an object with features that 
are teleologically sufficient to explain the sphere’s rotation.23 After all, Aristotle 
21 Why is primacy the main criterion of division? One way to explain its use is that the PM must 
be primary in the sense that its realization does not depend on the realization of anything else 
(satisfying the Priority Principle; cf. Ph. viii 1.251a19-23, 251b29-252a6). But my account may make 
additional sense of the primacy criterion in the following way. The sustoikia argument, on my 
account, serves its dialectical purpose by identifying a class of objects to which both the PM and the 
sphere belong: simple and actual substance. Since the sphere’s rotation is the primary form of motion, 
it is reasonable to divide by primacy in order to identify the relevant class to which both the PM and 
the sphere belong. Moreover, if the actuality of the mover and the movable are the same (e.g., Meta. 
xi 1066a26-34), the mover of primary motion must itself be primary and acting in its capacity as 
primary. 
22 On the one hand, he may mean that the whole the intelligible column contains the sort of 
entries that are fine and intrinsically choice-worthy, in the same way that the whole side is 
intelligible. At Meta. xiv 6.1093b11-14 he discusses the ‘table of the fine’ (τῆς συστοιχίας…τῆς τοῦ 
καλοῦ). This would justify inferring that the simple and actual are fine. Aristotle may intend it only to 
be plausible that the simple and actual are fine and choice-worthy. The ἐν + dative structure in τὸ 
καλὸν καὶ τὸ δι’ αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ συστοιχίᾳ may suggest that the fine and intrinsically choice-
worthy are merely among the entries in the positive column. 
23 I do not believe that I am committing Aristotle to a fact/value distinction. While it is possible 
to account for the relations between the simple, actual, and primary, and the fine, choice-worthy, and 
best, with a fact/value distinction, it is also possible to understand the first set of concepts as norma-
tive. Compare, e.g., concepts of standards, paradigms, harmonies, wholes, and unities, which have 
normative senses plausible in an ancient Greek philosophical context. Moreover, I am committing 
Aristotle only to the minimal and reasonable recognition that in order to establish that the sphere 
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needs to secure the goodness of the intelligible object in order to establish 
adequately that it has the final causal feature of moving without being moved 
(1072a27-30, b10-11). In the same way that identifying intelligibility as among 
the Prime Mover’s features explains how the Mover is able to move without 
being moved (because intelligible objects move that way), identifying simple and 
actual substance as among the Prime Mover’s features explains how it is able to 
move as a final cause because the simple and actual sort of substance is fine and 
intrinsically choice-worthy.  
I claim that the sphere’s rotation and the Prime Mover’s contemplation are 
coordinate activities instantiating this type-common form, simple and actual 
substance. While the Prime Mover is soon identified with thinking about thinking 
(1074b33-35), the argument in xii 7 that establishes the Mover of the sphere does 
not identify him with pure thinking. Rather, it picks out the simple and actual as 
the features of the intelligible substance in virtue of which it moves the sphere. 
Indeed, the articulation of the principle on which depends heaven and nature 
(1072b14) concludes without identifying the source of the sphere’s motion with a 
thinking being—the Mover of the sphere is at that point only an intelligible, 
simple, actual, fine, and choice-worthy substance. This warrants viewing the 
Prime Mover’s contemplation as coordinate, instead of prior, to rotation: rather 
than being the source of the sphere’s rotation, contemplation and rotation each 
help their substances instantiate a type-common form, ἡ ἁπλῆ καὶ κατ’ 
ἐνέργειαν.24 In virtue of engaging in each activity, the sphere and its Mover 
belong to the primary form of substance, the simple and actual, such that each is 
intrinsically good.  
That the sphere rotates in order to be in the Prime Mover’s formal condition is 
implicit in Aristotle’s response to an objection from Speusippus and the 
Pythagoreans later in xii 7. According to their objection: ‘The finest and best 
thing is not in the principle (ἀρχή), because of the fact that among plants and 
animals the principles are causes, but what is fine and complete (τέλειον) is in the 
things that come from the causes’ (1072b32-34). This is an objection to making 
the principle, the Prime Mover, a final cause. Aristotle rejects it on the grounds 
that the core claim, that what is fine and complete comes about from the 
principle, but could not be the principle, is false:  
For the seed is from other, prior, and complete beings, and the 
first thing is not the seed, but the complete being. For instance, 
one could say that a man is prior to the seed, not the one 
rotates because of some good end, he has to identify content for that end beyond its goodness. This 
does not require him to identify non-normative content per se.
24 Consider also the interpretation of Elders 1972, 168 that the sustoikia plays a role in division: 
a term on the sustoikia ‘signifies in particular the main line of the division’. Elders compares the divi-
sion at Top. 143b1 of living beings along three axes: footed—without feet; two-footed—multi-footed; 
featherless—feathered. I have suggested that Aristotle employs the sustoikia to identify the simple 
and actual among substance; following Elders’ interpretation, the contemplating god and the rotating 
sphere are plausibly members of the simple and actual substance as species of a genus, which may be 
reflected through different axes of the genus. 
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coming about from the seed, but a different man from whom 
the seed is produced. (1072b35-1073a3; cf. ix 8.1050a4-7).  
The Prime Mover is prior and complete, and the end for the sake of which the 
sphere moves, like the way that the complete human being has the form for the 
sake of which a child grows, the complete condition at which the child aims qua 
potential human (cf. Blyth 2015, 461-462). This suggests that the sphere’s 
motion stands to the Prime Mover’s simplicity and actuality as the seed’s/child’s 
generation does to the formal condition of a complete adult: the change (rotation, 
generation) is for the sake of achieving the formal condition attributed to both the 
source of change and the ultimate result, where the formal condition of the prior 
being is the cause of the change in the posterior one. Recalling the earlier 
discussion, in the way that the parent is in actuality the form that is the end 
(universally) of its child’s generation, and it is in virtue of the causal powers of 
that form that the child generates (i.e., due to the father’s reproductive 
capacities), the Prime Mover is in actuality the form that is (universally) the end 
of the sphere’s rotation, and it is in virtue of the causal powers of that form that 
the sphere rotates (i.e., due to the goodness of the Prime Mover’s simplicity and 
actuality).25 
The position I have defended distinguishes between the features of the 
sphere’s activity and constitution that figure essentially in the causal account 
Aristotle gives in xii 6-7 and other features of the sphere’s activity and 
constitution. It may be that the sphere has a soul and intelligence and that it 
eternally contemplates the Prime Mover. It seems possible that the sphere needs 
to be aware of the Prime Mover in order to for its rotation to be physically 
coherent. However, it also seems possible that the sphere lacks a soul and that its 
material constitution’s (aether) natural disposition to move in a circle physically 
explains the sphere’s rotation (Cael. i 2.269a2-b17, ii 3.286a10-18, 7.289a13-
16).26 The claims for which I have advocated are neutral with respect to issues 
such as these. I have argued that the sphere rotates because rotating achieves the 
goal of being a simple and actual substance, so that by identifying a simple and 
actual intelligible substance to serve as the sphere’s goal, Aristotle can causally 
explain the sphere’s rotation. Both the psychological and physical accounts of the 
mechanisms underlying the sphere’s rotation are plausible explanations of how 
25 One might worry that rotation cannot achieve simplicity and actuality as a substance, because 
rotation is a change in place rather than substance (cf. 1072b4-7). However, simple and actual 
substance must include more than necessary existence: Aristotle is supposed to be identifying the 
goal for the sphere that explains its rotation, but the sphere already has necessary being. Rather, ‘the 
simple and actual’ among substances must include all of the activities of the substance, such as 
locomotion. This is plausible even though Aristotle divides substance into the simple and actual: 
since being a substance is the ontological ground for all of the other kinds of change, it is reasonable 
to group substances in a way that reflects what kinds of change each kind is capable of, including 
topical change. The contrast between the sphere’s substance and the PM is predicated on such 
reasoning. In this way, both contemplation and rotation help their respective substances be simple and 
actual. 
26 For a defense of the physicalist reading and discussion of the issue of the sphere’s purported 
soul, see Blyth 2015. 
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the Prime Mover’s formal condition ‘attracts’ the sphere such that the sphere 
‘seeks’ the Mover’s condition.27 
III. Being a Simple and Actual Substance 
The previous explanation of the sphere’s rotation is subject to a plausible 
objection. Within Aristotle’s own system, rotary motion is a κίνησις (motion, 
change), and in the Physics and elsewhere κίνησις is an ‘incomplete actualiza-
tion’ of the movable (ἡ κίνησις ἐντελέχεια κινητοῦ ἀτελής, Ph. viii 5.257b6-10; 
cf. iii 1.201a9-18, b5-15), which Aristotle distinguishes from full actuality, in 
which the potential no longer exists, because it has been fully actualized (201b5-
15, Meta. xi 1065b33-1066a8). For instance, bricks are buildable into a house. 
When the house is being built the bricks are actual qua buildable; when the house 
is built, the bricks are no longer buildable, and so are no longer actual qua 
buildable. Hence, motion is an actualization of potential qua potential, such that 
it is ‘a certain actuality (ἐντελέχεια), but incomplete (ἀτελής)’ (Meta. xi 
1066a20-21, Ph. iii 2.201b24-202a3; cf. Meta. ix 6.1048a25).28 Aristotle clearly 
has his classification of motion in mind in xii 7: ‘Well then, if something is 
moved, it could be otherwise, so that if the actuality (ἐνέργεια) is primary 
locomotion, insofar as it is moved, in this way at least, it could be otherwise—in 
place, even if not in substance’ (1072b4-7; cf. 1050b20-28). The sphere exists 
necessarily, but it has a potential for locomotive change. In ix 8 Aristotle says 
that no eternal motion is potential, ‘except from where it starts to where it ends’ 
(ἀλλ᾿ ἢ πόθεν ποί, 1050b21), and ‘nothing prevents matter from being this way’ 
(1050b21-22) (this ‘topical’ matter is included in xii 2.1069b26). The sphere’s 
eternal rotation necessitates a corresponding capacity for spatial relocation of its 
material that it is always activating. Since rotation presupposes this ineliminable 
capacity, it seems that it cannot be simple and actual in the way my position 
requires.29 
Aristotle offers analyses of rotation in the Physics and De caelo that explain 
why, appearances notwithstanding, rotation achieves simplicity and actuality. In 
De caelo i 4.271a5-25 Aristotle presents the following paraphrased arguments 
against the view that there is a contrary to rotary motion: (1) while rectilinear 
motions from A to B and B to A are opposite, such bi-directional movements are 
not opposite when they occur along segments of a period, because the rectilinear 
motions are ‘limited’, while any point in any period may be traversed without 
ending the same, single motion; (2) motions from A to B and A to C within a 
27 Reductive, non-psychological accounts of Aristotle’s teleological science are explored in 
Henry 2013, 260-261 and Kahn 1985, 194, 196-202. 
28 In two of the passages on the sustoikia (Meta. xi 1066a15 ff., Ph. iii 221b24-202a3) Aristotle 
explains that it seemed reasonable to other thinkers to classify motion as privative, because motion 
seems to be neither potential nor actuality. Yet motion is not, by Aristotle’s lights, privative 
(1066a24-26). Rather, motion occupies the space between actuality and capacity as actualization of 
the potential qua potential. 
29 This problem is explored lucidly in Broadie 1993, 388-392 and Waterlow 1982, 248-257. 
period are not opposites, because both motions are directed at both points at 
once, along with every other point in the circle; (3) at whatever point in a period 
a rotator begins, the rotator necessarily traverses every point in the circle. 
Aristotle offers similar arguments in Physics viii 8-9. Rectilinear motion from 
point A to point B is contrary to the movement from B to A (264a7-264b1), so 
going from A and toward A involves two distinct instances of motion (264a14-
20). Any individual rectilinear motion is necessarily finite, and so incomplete 
(ἀτελής) (265a20-22). For rectilinear motion to be continuously extended, it 
would have to consist of composites of distinct contrary motions (265a17-24). In 
contrast, rotary motion from A is at the same time motion toward A, and, 
therefore, continuously extended rotary motion is single and possibly non-
compound (264b9-19). In Physics viii 9 Aristotle takes this structure of rotation 
to entail that it is necessarily prior to rectilinear motion, on the grounds that 
rotary motion is ‘simpler and more complete’ (ἁπλῆ γὰρ καὶ τέλειος μᾶλλον) 
(265a16-17). Whereas rectilinear motion can be infinite only as composites of 
distinct motions, rotary motion can be both infinite and single (265a17-24). Aris-
totle presents a similar conclusion about rotation in De Caelo: rotation is 
‘necessarily primary. For the complete [τέλειον] is naturally prior to the 
incomplete, and the circle is a complete thing [τῶν τελείων]. This cannot be said 
of any straight line…for in every case there is something beyond it, since any 
finite line can be extended’ (Cael. I.3 269a18-23, tr. Stocks in Barnes (1984)). 
I suggest that these features of rotation supply the resources needed for the 
sustoikia argument to succeed.30 For any of the points in an eternal rotator’s path 
of locomotion, that point completes a revolution from some point in the circle, 
both that very point and any other point in the circle. Since the sphere is eternally 
rotating, every point at which its parts are ever located always marks the end of 
some rotation from any location in the rotary path. This completeness-making 
feature of rotation is important to appreciate partly because it is present from the 
same perspective in which the sphere has an ineliminable capacity. On the most 
widely held view of the nature of topical matter in the scholarly literature, the 
sphere’s sole capacity is localized to line segments within its period. The sphere 
has a capacity for any part of its body P to move from point A at which it is 
spatially located at any time T to some other point in its path B at T + (N > 0).31 
On the view I just sketched, the physical features of rotation that make it 
completely actual are not only compatible with the continuous series of physical 
locomotion of its parts, but are part and parcel of the same overall physical 
structure. The same features that make it the case that the sphere’s parts have a 
capacity for change also make it the case that every point in the period is the 
30 My position only requires that Aristotle could reasonably assume these features of rotation. 
Given the compressed nature of the arguments in xii 7, it seems reasonable that he would establish the 
PM as simple and actual substance, such that its existence teleologically explains rotation, which is 
assumed to be simple and complete in the respects I articulate here. Moreover, the completeness of 
rotation is arguably built-in to the claim that the sphere’s actuality is primary locomotion. 
31 Cf. Beere 2009, 314-324, Elders 1972, 176, Makin 2006, xli, and Ross 1924, ii 265.
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terminus of a revolution.32 The same physical facts about the sphere make it both 
always complete a revolution and always in the process of completing another.  
Additionally, the necessary eternality of the sphere’s rotation complicates any 
simple picture of diachronic incompleteness. As Waterlow 1982, 250 observes 
(cf. Richardson-Lear 2004, 89), since the sphere never started rotating, ‘it follows 
that at every moment every part of the rotating body has just completed a circle; 
and since it will never end, there is never any falling short of a complete number 
of circles’. Given that the sphere’s rotation is eternal, incompleteness arises only 
from the temporally bound perspective we take when we isolate some in-
progress motion. From the perspective of the eternal, every one of the sphere’s 
rotations is complete.  
Finally, numerical individuation over time does not threaten the sphere’s sim-
plicity. Both the De caelo and Physics passages establish that rotation is simple 
because any revolution from A to B is directed toward every point in the circle, 
including A. Consequently, every revolution is individually simple: no segment, 
including an improper one, is a compound of distinct motions. This is clearly true 
from the perspective of a single revolution. Additionally, Aristotle indicates in 
Physics viii 9.265a17-24 that the feature of rotation in virtue of which each indi-
vidual revolution is simple also make rotations that traverse the same points more 
than once simple. The numerically individual motions, those in which the rotator 
has traversed the same point more than once, are in some sense the same motion. 
This is why Aristotle thinks rotation can be simple but continuous over an infi-
nite period of time. Moreover, it is plausible that this is part of the reasoning 
behind the correction that ‘simple’ is different from ‘one’ in the sustoikia argu-
ment: while the sphere engages in numerally distinct revolutions, its motion is 
the same from the perspective of ‘its own disposition’.33 This demonstrates Aris-
totle’s willingness to overlook the relevance of numerical distinctness over time 
with respect to simplicity, and to focus instead on undivided activity as the basis 
for being simple.  
IV. Imitation 
I want now to support my account by criticizing a nearby and popular 
competitor, the Imitation Thesis. On the Imitation Thesis, when an agent takes 
some activity as its end, but it cannot achieve that end, the first end, plus the 
capacities of the agent, entail another, secondary end, which the agent may 
actually achieve. It is possible to articulate this view with the following principle:  
Next Best: For any x, y, s, and r, there is a privileged set of conditions Δ such 
32 Cf. Ph. iv 13.222a34-b8—time is always both an origin (ἀρχή) of the immediate future and a 
completion (τελευτή) of the immediate past—and 12.222a10-17—time is always a limit.
33 Cf. DA iii 2.427a4-5. In Meta x 1, one of the senses of ‘one’ is that whose movement is ‘more 
indivisible and simpler’ (1052a19-22); yet Aristotle also emphasizes that what is ‘one’ is primarily a 
‘measure’ in the sense of a unit of measurement (1052b15-19). This suggests that while each revolu-
tion may be ‘one’ and therefore distinct (and which we may use for, e.g., dating purposes), it may 
nonetheless be simple in the sense of undivided, continuous activity. 
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that: if x has y as a goal, but there does not exist a means s by which x is able 
to act for the sake of y, x ought instead to r iff r best satisfies Δ.  
Imitation theorists widely hold some version of Next Best: the first sphere’s (x’s) 
goal (y) is to be maximally like the Prime Mover, but since it has a body, it must 
move, and so cannot be maximally like Prime Mover (there does not exist an s 
for this y), but since rotation (r) is most similar to the Prime Mover’s 
contemplation among the available options for the sphere (best satisfying this Δ), 
the sphere rotates (r).34  
The chief difference between the position I defend and the Imitation Thesis is 
how each view interprets the relation between the sphere’s rotation and the Prime 
Mover in the Mover’s capacity as the final cause of the rotation. According to the 
position I defend, rotation and contemplation are kinds of activities that share a 
feature, simplicity and actuality, such that the substances that engage in them are 
simple and actual.35 Possessing that feature is the sphere’s goal, and this is how 
the Prime Mover teleologically accounts for the sphere’s eternal rotation, and 
why the sphere and the Mover are simple and actual substances. By contrast, 
according to the Imitation Thesis, rotation is like contemplation, and the Prime 
Mover’s contemplation teleologically accounts for the sphere’s eternal rotation 
in virtue of that similarity relation. Because rotation is like contemplation, the 
sphere rotates as a way of achieving the goal of contemplating (and Next Best 
explains why rotation achieves that goal).36 These two positions are importantly 
different, since there are clear distinctions between one being performing an 
activity in order to instantiate a feature in virtue of which it is like another being, 
and one being performing an activity because it thereby instantiates a likeness-
making feature. For instance, I might train at boxing because I want to be a good 
boxer. Being a good boxer would make me like Muhammad Ali. Alternatively, I 
might train at boxing because I want to be like Muhammad Ali, and being a good 
boxer makes me like Muhammad Ali. In the present context, the Imitation Thesis 
maintains that the sphere rotates because its goal is to be like the Prime Mover, so 
it does whatever it can in order to have the most features that make it like the 
Prime Mover.37 In what follows, I criticize some of the purported textual support 
for the Imitation Thesis and argue that the position I defend makes notably better 
sense of Aristotle’s arguments.  
34 Elders 1972, 177, DeFillipo 1993, n22, Richardson-Lear 2004, 86-90, Ross 1924, i cxxxviii, 
Ross 2016, 209-210, 216-218, and Scharle 2008, 158. 
35 As I suggested in n24 above, it is plausible that the PM and sphere stand to the simple and 
actual substance as species of a genus, and that their respective activities (contemplation, rotation) 
ground those taxonomical relations. 
36 Elders 1972, 177, Richardson-Lear 2004, 89-90, Ross 2016, 217-218; but Bodnár 2016, 251-
252 prefers ‘congruent with’ to ‘like’. 
37 For this reason, many Imitation theorists maintain that the sphere’s rotation does not exhaust 
its PM-directed activity—primarily, the sphere also contemplates. See Elders 1992, 177, DeFillipo 
1994, n22, Richardson-Lear 2004, 89. Broadie 1993, 381; 2009, 240, and Bodnár 2016, 251 raise the 
objection that rotation must be the direct product of the PM’s causation, rather than a bodily by-prod-
uct of thinking.
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A central motivation for the Imitation Thesis is that it claims to capture one 
essential feature of Aristotle’s account: the sphere, in pursuing its end, is less 
well-off than the Prime Mover, who is absolutely perfect. This is because the 
sphere’s rotation is a secondary means of achieving contemplation, in accordance 
with Next Best. However, my view may satisfy the same motivation. I argued 
that the sphere’s rotation makes it simple and completely actual in certain 
respects, and that the Prime Mover and the sphere are alike insofar as they share 
this common kind. Yet the Prime Mover’s contemplation makes him simpler and 
more completely actual than the sphere’s rotation makes the sphere.38 The Prime 
Mover’s eternal noetic activity involves no motion at all, since he does not have a 
body, is unified with its own end (himself), and has no temporal dimensions (xii 
9). The sphere eternally and successively reaches an end conceived as points 
along its circular path. As I argued in the previous section, the sphere also has an 
ineliminable capacity for spatial relocation. In this way, the Prime Mover is 
superior to the sphere relative to being a simple and actual substance. Moreover, 
the underlying ontological ground of the difference is the fact that the Prime 
Mover lacks material and therefore a capacity for spatial relocation. Hence, while 
both the sphere and the Prime Mover achieve simplicity and actuality with their 
activities, there is a hierarchy among the activities with respect to that condition.  
The Imitation Thesis also purports to handle well Theophrastus’ critical 
question of why the sphere neither contemplates nor rests but rotates. I explained 
in section 2 that, on my account, cognition of the Prime Mover plays at most an 
enabling role for the sphere’s rotation. My thesis is that being a simple and actual 
substance, and not contemplation, is the sphere’s goal, which Aristotle uses to 
explain why it rotates. However, it is not obvious why, on my account, the sphere 
moves rather than rests. First, it is no more obvious that rotation is a better 
imitation of the Prime Mover than resting, by the same considerations.39 Second, 
on one recent interpretation of topical capacity, the sphere’s capacity is for 
motion as such, rather than for relocation of particular parts from particular 
points to other points (Judson 2016; cf. Broadie 1993, 399-401, DeFillipo 1994, 
n22). If the sphere has any such capacity for motion, then one way that the sphere 
achieves simplicity and actuality is that it activates its capacity to move. If it did 
not rotate, the sphere would have an unactualized capacity for motion. Moreover, 
since, according to the De caelo, the sphere is composed of a material that 
naturally moves in a circle (Cael. i 2.269a2-b17, ii 3.286a10-18, 7.289a13-16), 
resting would leave at least one natural capacity unactualized. Indeed, Aristotle 
maintains in De caelo i 7.276a22-26 that objects rest naturally only when they 
are located at the places to which they are naturally disposed to move. If the 
sphere did rest by nature, its failing to move in a circle would leave another 
38 That some types are included in the class of F things does not preclude there being 
comparative distinctions as to how F each type is. Compare Socrates’ ranking of kinds of knowledge 
at Philebus 55c-59e. 
39 That rotation is a better imitation of the PM than resting is assumed in Elders 1972, 177, 
Richardson-Lear 2004, ch. 4 n17, and Ross 2016, 218; cf. Bodnár 2016, 251.
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capacity unactualized. Additionally, since the sphere’s natural capacity is to 
move in a circle, it has no natural resting place.40 Finally, Aristotle criticizes the 
position of other thinkers who classify motion as a privative in the sustoikia 
(Meta. xi 1066a24-26, Ph. iii 2.201b16-202a2), favoring his own definition of 
motion as actualization of the potential qua potential, and he additionally 
suggests that rest and motion are contraries (e.g., 1068b6-7). If rest falls on the 
negative column, resting could not achieve the positive condition of being a 
simple and actual substance. 
In favor of the Imitation Thesis, Aristotle seems to commit to Next Best in De 
caelo ii 12, which responds to an aporia about the distribution of motions across 
the celestial bodies:41 
For it is plausible that what has the best achieves the good 
without action, that what is nearest to it should achieve it by 
little and simple action, and that which is farther removed by a 
complexity of actions, just as with men’s bodies one is well-off 
without exercise at all, another after a short walk, while 
another requires running and wrestling and hard training, and 
there are yet others who however hard they worked themselves 
could never secure that good, but some other thing… In action, 
again, when it is necessary to do this for the sake of that, that 
for the sake of another thing and again this for the sake of 
something else, one step or two present little difficulty, but as 
the series extends the difficulty grows… One thing then has 
and partakes of the best, another thing strives for it through few 
actions, another through many, while another does not even try 
but it is enough to come to something near the extreme. (Cael. 
ii 12.292b1-13) 
In context, the passage explains why there is greater diversity of motions among 
the celestial bodies between the Earth/lower planets and the outermost sphere of 
fixed stars, rather than a gradual increase of complexity between the sphere and 
the Earth. The explanation is teleological: the first sphere is able to achieve the 
‘divine principle’ with one motion, the intermediary bodies with many, while the 
Sun, Moon, and Earth are too far removed from the goal to achieve it directly 
with any motions, so that they resort to few (292b19-25).42 The teleological 
40 The PM is still explanatorily necessary, given these considerations, in the following way. It is 
possible for the sphere to fail to rotate, given merely that it is composed of a material with a disposi-
tion to move in a circle, in the same way that it is possible for fire to fail to move toward the extreme 
given only its natural capacity to be moved to the extreme. A corresponding principle of activity is 
necessary to explain what activates the natural capacity. The existence of the simple and actual intel-
ligible as the sphere’s aim explains why the sphere in fact moves by nature by providing a causal 
account of its actual motion. 
41 This passage is cited in defense of the Imitation Thesis in Bodnár 2016, 256-257, Richardson-
Lear 2004, 88, and Ross 2016, 210.
42 The divine principle is apparently the goal of each of the celestial bodies (292b19-25), but I 
will not speculate about it or its relation to the PM.
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explanation Aristotle offers presents four kinds relationships agents may have 
with a goal: (i) what ‘has the best’, which has no need of action, (ii) what 
undertakes few motions for the goal, (iii) what undertakes many motions for the 
goal, and finally, (iv) one kind of agent has a goal that she is trying to achieve in 
action (e.g., health), but when she lacks the means to that goal, she may do things 
for the sake of the actions that would achieve the goal (e.g., preparing herself to 
run). Aristotle accounts for this taxonomy by arguing that ends conditionally 
necessitate actions, and the longer the chain of actions leading to the end is, the 
more difficult it is for the agent to achieve the end; when none of the actions 
within the agent’s power make it all the way up the chain of actions to the goal, 
that agent may engage in whatever actions are within her power that are closest 
to the goal, but fall short of achieving it (e.g., an agent who loses weight for the 
sake of being healthy, but who is unable to be healthy). This last kind of 
teleology entails Next Best (the conditions Δ are being the closest action to the 
ultimate goal). 
Yet, De caelo ii 12 cannot serve as evidence for the Imitation Thesis. The 
Imitation Thesis would need rotation to be for the sake of the Prime Mover, but 
for the sphere not to be able to perform any actions higher along the chain 
necessitated by the Mover, such that rotation is the closest it can come to its goal 
while also failing to achieve the goal. But this would reproduce the problem of 
explaining how rotation is instrumental to the sphere’s goal and why it is higher 
up the chain than either rest or contemplation. Further, Aristotle does not suggest 
that when Next Best applies, the agent to whom it applies settles on an action 
because that action imitates the goal. At best, imitation is a special application of 
Next Best that Aristotle never mentions. Moreover, Aristotle offers Next Best not 
as an explanation of the teleological structure in the relation between the Prime 
Mover and the sphere, which achieves its goal directly and with one motion, but 
between the Earth/lower planets and the good achieved by the sphere. Indeed, 
when Aristotle talks unambiguously about cosmic imitation, the object is the 
sphere itself: elements imitate the sphere’s rotation by cyclically changing into 
each other (GC ii 10.336b25-337a7, Meta. ix 8.1050b29-34); living things 
reproduce as species in order to attain the divine eternality of the cosmos (DA ii 
4.415a23-b7).43 The only passage where it is possible that the object of imitation 
is the Prime Mover is De caelo ii 12, but that requires taking the ‘divine 
principle’ to be the Prime Mover, which is at least not obvious (cf. Berti 2000, 
201, Blyth 2015, 448, and Judson 1994), and ignores the fact that the relevant 
relation obtains between the Earth/lower planets and the cosmic goal, specifically 
in contrast to the relation between the sphere and the goal. 
I believe that the position I defend is considerably more appealing than the 
Imitation Thesis. The core of the Imitation Thesis is the idea that similarity is the 
teleological ground for the sphere’s rotation, conjoined with the purported 
similarity between rotation and contemplation. Yet as I pointed out above, 
Aristotle never says that the sphere is trying to be like the Prime Mover and does 
43 This observation is made in Berti 2000, 201, Bodnár 2016, 252, and Broadie 2009, n9. 
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not deploy this idea in his account of the sphere’s rotation. He says that there is a 
simple and actual intelligible substance among the unmovables, that this 
substance is a final cause in the sense of an object of love, and that its teleological 
properties make it the moving cause of the sphere’s eternal and constant 
revolution. My position captures these core claims without grafting similarity 
onto the account. While the sphere’s motion allows it to instantiate a feature in 
virtue of which it is like the Prime Mover, that feature explains its rotation just 
because it is intrinsically good. In this way, Aristotle explains the sphere’s 
rotation by identifying a corresponding substance of the same kind, which causes 
the sphere’s rotation in virtue of belonging to that kind but without requiring a 
cause of its own.44   
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